

The  
Partisan in War,  
of the use of a  
Corps of Light Troops  
to an  
Army.  
By  
Lieut. Col. A. Emmerich.

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MDCCLXXXIX.

To His Royal Highness

The Duke of York,  
&c. &c. &c.

Royal Duke,

I had, the honour to serve His Majesty, your Royal Father, as Partisan to the allied army under the command of Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, during the last war in Germany, until the peace in 1762.

I had also the honour of serving in the British army during the late war in America, until the peace in 1783.

The distinguished attachment your Royal Highness shows to the profession of a soldier, and the hopes with which the public spirit of your example animates the army, have made me therefore solicit the permission with which I am honoured, to lay the observations I made, during my various expeditions in that capacity, at your Royal Highness's feet.

In hopes, that an account of my failures, as well as successes, will be of use to those, who, in

future, undertake the same duty, and advance the service to which I have the honour to belong, I most respectfully beg leave to subscribe myself,

ROYAL DUKE,

Your Royal Highness's

Most obedient, and

Most devoted humble servant,

*Andreas Emmerich,*

Lieut. Colonel.

St. James's Park, London,

March 14th, 1789.

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# THE PARTISAN IN WAR.

## Chapter 1.

*Of a Partisan in general.*

In war, no army can act without light troops. Its operations, and even existence depends upon them.

Such light troops ought properly to be composed of select chasseurs<sup>1</sup> with rifles, light infantry with bayonets, and light dragoons<sup>2</sup> or hussars; though sometimes, and particularly by the English, the light infantry of different regiments, are formed into battalions, and supported by grenadiers.

A corps composed of those three sorts of light troops, ought not to be less than a thousand, nor exceed seventeen hundred men in number, who should all be volunteers, it being unsafe to compel men into such a service.

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<sup>1</sup>Chasseurs: certain type of light infantry troops.

<sup>2</sup>Dragoon: a musketeer mounted on horseback, sometimes fighting on foot but mostly on horseback, as occasion requires. -- *Simes Military Medley*, London: 1768.

When an army is in motion, the business of the light troops is to form the advance guard, to protect the flanks, and provide in every respect possible for the safety of its march; and when the army of the enemy retreats, to harass their rear.

When the army halts, and forms an encampment, the partisan<sup>3</sup> or officer, who has the command of the light troops, advances with his corps, and takes his station at such a distance from the army as circumstances may require, fixes his picket guards, places his centinels, sends out patrols, and from time to time makes his reports to the commander in chief of the situation, strength, advanced posts, motions and probable designs of the enemy.

When the army retreats, the corps of light troops must form the rear guard, in order to cover its retreat; and when it halts, the partisan must keep his station behind, detach his picket guards, centinels and patrols, and carefully prevent desertion to the enemy, which is often attempted in the retreat of an army. If the enemy should advance, the partisan must

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<sup>3</sup>Partisan: a person very dextrous in commanding a party; and who, knowing the country well, is employed in getting intelligence, or surprising the enemy's convoy. -- *Simes Military Medley*, London, 1768.

not only immediately inform the commander in chief of their motion, but likewise the troops in the rear of the army, that they may instantly prepare and hold themselves ready for whatever may happen. When the army has retreated, and after a fatiguing march is at rest in its encampment, it is then the particular duty of the light troops to prevent its being surprised, or disturbed, and alarmed by trifling causes.

It is of the utmost consequence therefore to an army, that the person appointed to the command of a corps of light troops, should not only be an officer of approved good conduct, experience in service, and in whom the greatest confidence may safely be reposed, as from the nature of his command, it may sometimes be found necessary, by the commander in chief, to entrust him with the paroles and countersigns<sup>4</sup> for several days together; the disclosure of which might be attended with fatal consequences to the whole army; but a partisan should also be a person of a strong constitution and active mind, and capable of undergoing the greatest fatigue of both. Great caution is likewise necessary in the choice of the other officers of a light corps, who should be men of known

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<sup>4</sup>A parole is a watch word that differs from the countersign in that it is only known to the officers of the guard while the countersign is given to all soldiers.

sobriety, activity, fidelity, and hardy constitutions; such a corps being infinitely more exposed to laborious and difficult service, than any other troops whatever; more especially as they are never to be incumbered with tents; the security of an army depending chiefly upon the vigilance of the partisan.

A partisan who suffers himself to be surprised by an enemy, is, in my humble opinion, inexcusable; his corps may happen to be attacked, and cut to pieces, but he must never suffer himself to be surprised, either in camp or in quarters. -- That such a corps, while properly attentive to its duty, can never meet with this accident, will not, I believe, be doubted, from the following fact.

General Freytag, in the Hanoverian service, commanded during the whole of the last German war, a respectable corps of light troops, composed of mounted and dismounted chasseurs, which, though on constant actual service, from the vigilance, strict discipline, and good order, invariably observed by him, were never in any one instance surprised. This is a proof of the extreme utility of such troops, when acting under the direction of an experienced officer, who makes this part of the profession his particular study.

On the contrary, the extreme danger to be apprehended from remissness, or want of circumspection and alertness, in troops entrusted with the advanced posts of an army, the two following instances will fully demonstrate.

In the year 1760, a corps of French troops, consisting of between five and six thousand men, under the command of General Clauwitz, among which there was a regiment of hussars, (called the regiment of Pirchinez) was stationed at Emsdorff, in the Hessian dominions, near Ciginhain. The present Duke of Brunswick, at that time hereditary Prince, took his measures so properly, that he surprised and made the whole body prisoners at twelve o'clock at noon. -- Had the Pirchinez regiment been careful, even so far as to have kept patrols out, they must have discovered the Prince's intentions, and defeated his design, as he was not two miles distant from the French encampment, when he formed his plan of attack. This circumstance sufficiently shows, that however, secure troops may think they are, they should never relax in their vigilance, as the French did upon this occasion; for a small detachment, to which I then belonged, from General Freytag's corps, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel

Frederick, kept hovering in front of General Clauwit's army for several days, and occasionally sending patrols, to harass their advanced posts, which so effectually amused them, that they left themselves entirely exposed to this coup-de-main of the prince.

The second instance occurred in the late American war, to Colonel Rall, who was stationed with three battalions of Hessian grenadiers, some chasseurs, and a detachment of light dragoons, by the commander in chief, at the advanced post of the British army, at Trenton, on the river Delaware. Through the want of the same circumspection and vigilance, which proved fatal in the foregoing instance, he suffered himself to be surprised by the troops of Mr. Washington, who finding his situation at that time desperate, was disposed to try his last and only effort, for a change of fortune; he accordingly succeeded, and made prisoners of almost the whole of that noble corps, which, by the shameful neglect and want of attention to discipline in their commander, became an early conquest to an undisciplined banditti; but had they been duly watchful, and prepared for such an attempt, they might have confidently opposed Washington's whole force, and baffled his design.

The consequences that followed their misconduct, are too well known to make it necessary for me to say more, than that the Landgrave of Hesse Cassell can never forget the indignity suffered by a corps of his bravest troops on that occasion, owing to the want of vigilance and good conduct in an officer entrusted with an advanced post of such importance. This is a still more striking example of the accidents that may arise from an officer, who has the command of an out-post, ever suffering himself to be a moment off his guard, even if he should think himself secure from danger or insult. Colonel Rall had, on all former occasions, proved himself a brave, experienced, and attentive officer; it was therefore particularly happy for him, that he lost his life in that unfortunate event, for had he survived, it must have fixed a stigma on his character, in the opinion of all military men, and most probably have occasioned him to experience the resentment of his prince.

From the foregoing examples, it is sufficiently evident, that too much caution cannot be used in the choice of an officer for the command of a corps of light troops, which are always to occupy the out-posts of an army; and as it must, in a very great measure, be left to himself to take advantage of every favourable opportunity that may occur, to annoy the enemy, and

frustrate their intentions. The frequent change of circumstances that daily, and perhaps hourly, happens on service, does not admit of a propriety, or even possibility of his adhering invariably to any fixed instructions; he must often therefore be guided by his own discretion, in the occurrence of the moment, while he acts as a careful and vigilant watch to the army, and a spy to the commander in chief: neither is it to be considered to his discredit, when he apprehends an unsurmountable danger, from a superior force of the enemy, or from any stratagem laid for himself, if he should fall back towards his own army, and thereby defeat their designs, either of cutting him off from the main body, or of getting between his corps and any part of the army.

## CHAPTER II.

*Of the kind of men proper for a light corps; of their exercise, and other regulations necessary for their good order, &c.*

1. The men who are admitted into a corps of light troops should not be under eighteen, nor exceed thirty-five years of age.
2. No man should be taken into the corps who does not enter voluntarily, or who is not very active, and free from all bodily complaints.
3. The chasseurs ought to be selected for their activity, and to be tried and approved marksmen.
4. The light dragoons or hussars ought to be sprightly, lively and active men.

As light troops are intended for rapid movements, the men at their first entering into the corps, should be made perfect in their exercise, such as in loading quick, marching well, manoeuvring with great exactness, forming the line, divisions, or columns, with equal regularity and speed, expert in

firing, and taught also to level well, in order that their fire may always have proper effect.

When the men are perfect in all the essential parts of their duty, it will be unnecessary to fatigue or harass them with field days, as such a corps is intended solely for active services, and not for parade; but they should notwithstanding never be suffered to relax in their discipline. And they should on every convenient occasion be particularly instructed how to cover a retreat, which requires every movement to be made with the utmost regularity, that the men may always be ready to form in a moment, to take advantage of any opportunity that may offer to repel the enemy; for in conducting a retreat well, an officer is put to the severest trial of his judgement, fortitude and skill.

In the year 1760, Duke Ferdinand had intelligence that a brigade of French cavalry, consisting of sixteen hundred men, were detached from the French army, but being unable to learn their route, he immediately sent orders to the different corps of light troops to be on their guard, as he suspected the brigade was out upon some enterprize. General Freytag's corps of Hanoverian chasseurs, being at that time stationed at Newhause, Major

Hatdorff of the same corps, under whose command I had then the honor to be, took with him four hundred mounted, and two hundred dismounted chasseurs, and marched in quest of the French, to Paderborn, where he left his infantry for the purpose of covering his retreat, in case there should be occasion for it.

Moving forward with his cavalry about three miles from Paderborn, he came in the afternoon into a wood, within two hundred yards of the French brigade, before either party discovered the other. The French had at this time nearly saddled all their horses, with a view, as it was afterwards known, to join some other French troops, and make an attack on Freytag's corps that night.

But on discovering Hatdorff's small detachment so near them, they instantly mounted, came forward, flushed with confidence of making prisoners of the whole party, and then of carrying their original design into execution; but Major Hatdorff manœuvred with so much judgement and skill, as to resist every effort they made to break his ranks; -- And although often surrounded, and at the same time occasionally skirmishing with them, he, in a more masterly manner than it is possible for me to describe, so as to do justice to that officer, in an open level country effected a retreat, in the face of an

enemy, consisting of sixteen hundred men, reckoned amongst the best cavalry in the French army, and got into Paderborn under cover of his infantry, with the loss only of a trifling number of his detachment.

In America, in 1780, the commander in chief, Sir Henry Clinton, having reason to suspect that the French troops under the command of Count Rochambeau, lately landed at Rhode Island, were on their march to form a junction with Washington at the White Plains, ordered me, with a small detachment of about one hundred and fifty infantry, Hessians and Provincials, to move in the evening towards Philips's Manor, to gain what intelligence I could respecting their motions. Having proceeded to a place above Colonel Philips's house, I fell in with a detachment of Washington's army, attacked it, and made some prisoners, from whom I learned that the French had actually joined Washington, and that both had marched towards Kingsbridge.

This information naturally led me to consider of the best means of effecting my retreat; hearing, almost at the same instant, a sharp firing towards Kingsbridge, which I concluded was between the enemy and a detachment of Hessian chasseurs, who were ordered to join me the next morning, for my

support. I directed my march close along the North River, to secure my right flank; but had not proceeded far, when I saw a great number of boats coming up the North River, after having landed General Lincoln at a place below me, called Spiking Devil<sup>5</sup>, and which was the only place at which I could pass, Mr. Washington's army having occupied all the ground to my left, as far as Morrisino<sup>6</sup>. Thus situated, I continued my march as close and as silent as possible, along the North River, until I was discovered by Sheldon's regiment of rebel dragoons<sup>7</sup>, who tried to take me, and offered me favourable terms to surrender; but finding me disinclined to accept of them, and seeing that my detachment bore a firm and steady aspect, they were obliged to let me pass, until I arrived at Spiking Devil, to which place the Hessian General Losberg sent a reinforcement to secure my retreat.

When I found upon my return from beyond Philips's Manor, that the enemy had taken possession of all the ground between Kingsbridge and Spiking

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<sup>5</sup>Spuyten Duyvil, NY.

<sup>6</sup>Morrisania, NY.

<sup>7</sup>2nd Dragoons commanded by Colonel Elisha Sheldon of Connecticut. Benastre Tarleton and the British Legion tried unsuccessfully to defeat him at Poundridge NY on July 2, 1779.

Devil, I saw many difficulties in my way; but having still in my remembrance the retreat made by Major Hatsdoff, and consequently what was possible to be done by troops of a cool and determined temper, I encountered them all, and was happy enough to execute the business on which I was sent, to the satisfaction of the commander in chief; and brought all my men safe back.

*An idea of a complete establishment for a Corps of Light  
Troops.*

1 Colonel  
2 Lieutenant-Colonels.  
3 Majors.  
9 Captains.  
3 Captain-Lieutenants.  
27 Lieutenants.  
5 Cornets.  
10 Ensigns.  
1 Chaplain.  
3 Adjutants.  
2 Quarter-Masters of Infantry.  
1 Surgeon to the Corps.  
6 Surgeon's Mates.  
5 Quarters-Masters of Cavalry.  
45 Serjeants.  
60 Corporals.  
5 Trumpeters.  
5 Horns.  
10 Drummers and Fifers.  
1,500 Private Men.  
5 Farriers.  
1 Armourer.  
1 Master Sadler.

Total 1,710

## **Chapter III.**

### *The Cloathing, &c. necessary.*

Having proposed the number of officers, non-commissioned officers and private men, of which a corps of light troops might consist, it may not be improper to mention the cloathing, arms, &c. necessary to equip them for the kind of service which may be required of them in an active campaign.

1. Their cloathing should be made of good materials, as they are to be constantly in the field, and without tents, and require therefore that they should in other respects be as comfortable as the nature of their service will permit.
2. Their arms should in every particular, be of the best kind, and shorter and lighter than those commonly used by other troops: Their accoutrements should likewise be light, and entirely adapted for the nature of their service.
3. No more baggage ought to be carried

with them on actual service, than what is absolutely necessary. An officer should be allowed only six shirts; a non-commissioned officer and soldier, three shirts each, and other necessaries in proportion.

4. To every hundred men with their officers, either of cavalry or infantry, there should be allowed one cart with two good horses; this cart should be of a particular construction, with a cover, and so calculated as to be able to pass in any sort of roads.
5. The commanding-officer of the corps ought to be allowed one cart of the same kind, and one bât horse.
6. One cart should be allowed to the surgeon, to carry his medicine chest, &c.
7. One cart for the carriage of some cloathing and spare arms of every kind.
8. One cart for the farrier-major to carry his tools, horse-medicines, ready made

horse-shoes, nails, &c.

9. Two sutlers to such a corps will be found necessary and extremely useful. They should be allowed two carts and two bât horses each. Whenever the corps marches, the sutlers are constantly to be provided with a quantity of biscuit and bread &c. which is to be carried on their bât horses, that in case of the carts not being able to come up where the corps takes its ground, which may often happen to be in forests or on mountains, the troops may not at any time be distressed for a small supply of provisions.
10. One ammunition cart, particularly well secured, in which an ample supply of ammunition for rifles, muskets and carbines, is constantly to be carried, in order to be ready at all times, in cases of emergency.
11. The officers ought to have as few servants as possible, and those, as well as every other person belonging to the

corps, ought to be cloathed in the same uniform, that they may be always known to the corps, and that strangers may thereby be prevented from ever mixing with the soldiers, or coming to them, on any pretence, without being discovered.

12. Thirty pioneers, who should be men well used to the axe and saw, would be found of very great utility, for the purposes of facilitating the movements of the corps, by repairing or destroying bridges, &c. &c.
13. Every light dragoon should constantly be provided with two spare horse-shoes, fitted to his horse's feet, and eighteen nails; the shoes to be fastened to the holsters, that whenever a shoe is lost, another may be immediately fitted on.

## **Chapter IV.**

### *The Duties of a Partisan.*

Having said so much of the Partisan in general, and his corps, I shall speak of his duties in particular, and begin with a detail of them, as follows, viz.

1. He must procure good and faithful spies, who have a thorough knowledge of the country where the operations of a campaign are to be carried on; and it must be his particular study to manage them in such a manner, as to avoid, as much as possible, letting any one of them know the business on which another is employed. This caution is necessary, to prevent their being able to impose upon him, by having all one story to tell him.
2. It is absolutely necessary that he should get acquainted with some of the principal inhabitants of whatever country he may be in, and use his endeavours to discover whether they are

attached to the cause, in which he is engaged, from national principles, or mercenary expectations, in order that he may avail himself of the information which he may be able to obtain from them, through either motive, and not be entirely dependent on his spies for intelligence.

3. When deserters from the enemy come in to his post, they are to be received kindly, but to be escorted with all convenient speed to head quarters, lest they should have come for other purposes than those they profess, and in order to give them no opportunity of tampering with his men, or enticing them to desert.
4. Every intelligence of the situation and designs of the enemy, ought to be forwarded the moment it is received, to the commander in chief, or the adjutant general, according to its urgency and importance. At the same time, if, while the Partisan is moving before the army, he should meet with any rivers, which

must be crossed in their march, he must find out the safest ford or passage for them, and give information of it to his commander.

## **Chapter V.**

### *Of Marching by Day.*

Having stated everything necessary to the equipment of a corps of light troops for service, I shall next mention the rules to be observed in their marches by day, and first:

### *The Order of March.*

1. One corporal, with two men on horseback in front.
2. One corporal, with three chasseurs and three light infantry men to follow.
3. One serjeant, with six chasseurs and six light infantry men to follow, the last-mentioned corporal, out of which number, he is to detach one man on each flank.
4. One Serjeant, with twelve light dragoons, who is likewise to detach flanking parties, if the country will

permit of it, but if not, this duty must be performed by infantry.

5. One subaltern, with two serjeants, two corporals and thirty infantry, to follow, who is also to send out flanking parties.
6. The captain who is on duty for the day when the march commences, is to move next, with one hundred men, commissioned and non-commissioned officers in proportion, composed of cavalry, chasseurs, and light infantry, and in like manner to detach flanking parties.
7. The main body follows last, one troop of cavalry heading the column, if in an open country; then all the infantry, and the remainder of the cavalry closing the line of march. A sufficient guard of cavalry and infantry ought to be always left to bring up the baggage.

In the order of march above stated, it must be carefully observed, that every succeeding party is never to lose sight of the party immediately in its

front, but to keep at a regular distance from it.

## CHAPTER VI.

*Of Marching by Night.*

*Order of March.*

1. A faithful corporal, and six trusty infantry men, with a confidential guide, ought to march first, in the greatest silence.

If the corporal should find an enemy's patrol approaching, he is to halt, and immediately dispatch one of his men back to the next party, falling back at the same time with his own party, to the right and left, that he may suffer the enemy's patrol to advance, until he can discover their number. If he finds their strength superior to his own, he is to retreat towards the party

immediately behind him,  
to which he before sent  
intelligence; but if he finds  
it inferior or equal only, he  
is to rush upon them, make  
the men prisoners, but  
without firing, send them  
immediately to his  
commanding officer, and  
wait his further orders.

2. A serjeant with fifteen infantry, ought to follow the corporal, at a distance not greater than two hundred yards, so that he may always be at hand to support him, if occasion requires it, according to the method above directed.
3. A subaltern with two serjeants, two corporals, and thirty men, ought to follow the serjeant, sending two men in front, who are never to lose sight of the serjeant's party, or to be out of the hearing of the subaltern.
4. The commanding officer is to follow next with the main body, the infantry in

front, and the cavalry closing the march; flanking parties of infantry are to keep at such a distance, as always to be able to observe the movement of the main body.

#### *CAUTIONS.*

1. In all marches of a light corps, silence is commendable; but in night marches, the profoundest silence is absolutely necessary; the cavalry should be particularly instructed, that in case of a sudden halt, the men must constantly keep working their bridles, that they may thereby prevent the neighing of their horses.
2. But yet, as it often unavoidably happens, that troops have to pass wooden or stone bridges in the night, when the noise made by the march of cavalry or carriages, over such places, can be heard at a great distance, (particularly by a watchful enemy;) to prevent this, the pioneers should, upon such occasions, lay straw or loose earth

upon them.

3. In night marches, particularly when both the men and horses are greatly fatigued, it frequently happens, that confusion arises from the men falling asleep; the horses finding themselves then unchecked by the bridle, and being also tired, are apt to stop; the men in the rear, whether they are or are not so sleepy, thinking the leading file halted, may imagine the halt to be general, and consequently fall also asleep. The front of the line continues its march, ignorant of the cause which has stopped those behind them, and by that means the line gets separated. From this circumstance, though apparently trifling, much alarm and disappointment often ensues.
4. To prevent any accident of this kind from ever happening to a corps of light troops, two or more active serjeants might be appointed to ride backwards and forwards, from the front to the rear of the line, during the whole march, and carefully attend to its strict regularity

and order.

N.B. As a whole army may be liable to experience a similar embarrassment from the same circumstance, I submit to the judgement of commanders in chief, the propriety of appointing a field officer, with a sufficient number of captains, subalterns, and non-commissioned officers, for the purpose of executing the same duty to an army in night marches.

5. It has often happened, that the march of an army or a large body of troops, has been impeded in the night time, by small parties from the enemy occasionally appearing on the flanks of the line of march, and firing a few scattered shots at them. As this is often returned by the fire of a whole regiment, a confusion is caused in the line of march by it. In order to guard against any such cause of alarm or inconvenience, it would be proper always, previous to the march of an army, to appoint a subaltern of the

infantry, joined by three, four, or five men from each company, as occasion may require, to advance towards such small parties, add immediately disperse them; unless he should find that they were only a part of a greater force, in which case, he should send immediate notice to the commanding officer, that he may take such measures as he thinks fit.

When horse patrols are sent out, they should be warned, on pain of the most exemplary punishment, never to dismount or quit their horses for a moment, especially for the purpose of going into houses for refreshment; as instances have occurred, where soldiers, that have done so, have had their horses taken away, even from the doors of such houses, by the enemy.

6. Having explained how a march by night ought to be conducted, the same method will equally apply to a march by day, in a thick and close fog.

7. A Partisan ought always to employ guides, who voluntarily offer to serve in that capacity for reward; but never to force them into his service; for on the first appearance of danger, or in time of the least confusion, they will take every opportunity of running away, -- it is therefore much better to procure willing guides, who may become attached to him from kind treatment, and the prospect of reward for the risks they may run.
8. At all times when the corps is drawn up, either for a march, or in order to make detachments from it, the adjutants must tell the men off into divisions, subdivisions, &c. and assign the officers, their respective stations, which they are, on no account whatsoever to quit, during their march, either by day or by night, as they are to be responsible for the proper intervals, between the several divisions, being regularly preserved, so that the whole or any part of the corps may be able to form, with the greatest regularity, at a moment's

notice.

9. If at any time it should be found advisable or necessary for the corps to make a retreat, it must be done exactly in the same manner as it advanced, with this difference, that what was the rear of the line, becomes then the front, and what was the front, becomes then the rear.

Having before mentioned the necessary qualifications of a Partisan, I cannot omit again saying, that the abilities requisite for conducting a branch of the service upon which so much depends, are rarely to be attained by the common routine of duty. An officer may be of approved courage, understand the discipline necessary for the command of a regiment in every situation, it may be required to act in the line, and acquit himself with credit, on all such occasions, yet as light troops are intended and adapted for particular services, the officer who is appointed to command them, should not only have experience of service in general, but also possess the peculiar talents adequate to the discharge of the duty of so arduous and important a command; even a commander in chief cannot possibly frame instructions for his conduct on all occasions, as the

nature of the service on which he is employed is such, that his own experience alone can be the rule -- by which his steps are to be regulated, particularly if he has opposed to him a Partisan, who understands his business, and who, it is naturally to be supposed, will be the most experienced officer, in that kind of service, that can be selected from the army of the enemy.

## CHAPTER VII.

*Of the precautions to be observed by  
a Partisan.*

1. When a corps, or a considerable detachment from it, is ordered upon any enterprise or to reconnoitre, it may happen that their motions are known to the enemy, who finding himself not strong enough to attack them, will lie concealed, until he finds that the corps or detachment is returned to its station; when presuming, that the men and horses, from being fatigued and exhausted, will of course, as soon as they have posted the pickets, retire to rest; waits for that moment to make his attack with a prospect of success; and accordingly immediately drives in the pickets, expecting to find the main body unprepared to receive him.

To prevent any such advantage from being taken of him by an enemy, the Partisan, after having posted the

necessary pickets, should in person remain with fifty or one hundred men, at a convenient distance between the pickets and his station, so as to be himself at hand to support the pickets, observing upon all occasions this general rule, that one third of the corps shall be always at their arms, whilst the rest are refreshing themselves and their horses. By this precaution, he will not only be able to disappoint any design of an enemy, but also very probably to turn his expected victory into a complete defeat.

2. Whenever a station is taken by a corps of light troops, alarm posts ought to be fixed, to which, in case of alarm, the troops are immediately to repair. -- And these alarm posts should be frequently changed, to prevent the enemy from ever gaining any knowledge of them.
3. A field officer, two captains, six subalterns with two hundred men, and a proportionate number of non-commissioned officers, cavalry and

infantry, completely armed and accoutred, should assemble every evening, and send out patrols during the night, between the head station and the out-posts, which will always prevent the possibility of a surprise, particularly if the corps is brought to such a degree of discipline and good order, as to be ready to turn out at a moment's notice, properly armed and accoutred, fit for action.

4. In posting the videts in the daytime, the highest situation to be found, should be chosen, to enable them to see around them, to a greater distance, and the centries on foot ought to be posted one or two hundred yards in their rear, but so as to have each other constantly in view; -- their arms ought always to be loaded, and whenever a videt discovers an enemy, he is to give notice, by firing; upon which the foot centry is to retreat towards the officer of his own picket, who must have a centinel constantly posted at a very small distance from the picket; this last centinel is immediately

to inform the officer of the firing, who must directly send a small patrol to the alarmed videt, and at the same time dispatch a light dragoon to the commanding officer of the corps with the intelligence.

5. In the night time, the foot centry must be the furthest advanced, and the videt in his rear, but at such a distance that they can observe one another, -- and to prevent a possibility of any man's deserting, or any enemy passing, the chain of centries should be so formed, that no two of them are so near, as to be able to converse together, nor at so great a distance, as to pass between them undiscovered. The line of videts should be so placed in the rear of the chain of centries, as to occupy the intervals. The out-centries in the night time, instead of being posted on the highest situations, as the videts should be in the day time, must on the contrary be placed in the lowest, by which means they can much better see any object, by looking up the accents, than they could by looking

down from them. When the patrols go their rounds in the night time, and are demanded by the centries and videts, to give the countersign, they must never suffer any person to come nearer to them than the distance of at most three yards; and the countersign must never be given in a louder voice than is necessary for the centry to hear it, lest an enemy, or his spy should lie concealed so near as to catch it.

6. The officer of the picket must frequently change his situation, during the night. In cold weather, when it is necessary to have fires, it would not be amiss to leave them burning, when he moves to a fresh place, and even to leave some of the mens packs on the ground; for if the enemy should have meditated an attack upon his post, they would naturally direct their motions to the place where they had perceived the fires; but on coming up and finding the soldiers' packs, it is reasonable to suppose they would conclude that the picket had fled precipitately, and while

they were taking up the packs, or otherwise off their guard, the officer of the picket would have a very favourable opportunity of striking an advantageous blow.

A circumstance similar to this fell under my own observation in the year 1760. It was as follows: Having a detachment of hussars and chasseurs under my command, near Northeim, in the Hanoverian dominions, the enemy, by means of their spies, received intelligence of my situation. A strong detachment of Monsieur Belsance's cavalry, from Gettingen, was consequently ordered to endeavour to attack me by surprise, and had actually the address to carry off one of my videts, by the stratagem of a farmer's waggon, conducted by three French soldiers in disguise.

As they passed his post, the soldier who was the driver, being challenged by my videt, answered, that he belonged to the neighbourhood, and entering into other conversation with my sentinel, came so

near at last, without being suspected, that he suddenly sprung upon him, and with the assistance of the other two, secured him before he could fire.

Unsuspecting of any discovery of my station, or any accident to my videt, and the weather being cold, we had made fires; after having for some time warmed ourselves, upon hearing a noise, I fell back with my party about two hundred yards; then listening with great attention, I soon could hear the enemy approaching with the utmost silence and caution. As soon as they came near the fires we had just quitted, they threw in their shot; but finding no resistance, they exclaimed, that the enemy had fled, then dismounted, and fell to rifling some packs my people in their hurry had left behind them. This I could perceive by the light of the fires, and thinking it the most advantageous moment to attack them, accordingly rushed upon them, after killing several, took nine prisoners.

General Luckner, who was stationed at

Icefeld, to my left, and alarmed by the firing of my party, discovered a strong detachment coming to attack him, with which he engaged, and soon after we met, driving the enemy before us, and pursued them to the gates of Gettingen. This instance may prove a caution to others.

9. A Partisan should always, when he sends out the night pickets, give to the officers commanding them, a particular countersign, besides the general countersign of the army, in order that if any soldier should desert in the night, they may immediately make use of that secret countersign, in the corps; the change however must be communicated as soon as possible to the commanding officer, who will in like manner, acquaint the next troops of it, so that it may be quickly known to the pickets of the army, and any ill consequences that might otherwise follow, be thereby prevented. -- A centinel must never, I have said, allow a stranger to approach nearer to him than the distance of three

yards, neither must he ever hold discourse with, or take a dram, on his post, from any person.

10. The commanding officer of the light corps must always have a trumpeter or drummer at hand, that in case he receives intelligence of any immediate danger, he may instantly order one or the other to sound, or beat an alarm.
11. Dogs should never be suffered amongst a light corps in quarters, nor to be with them at any time in the field; as many discoveries of dangerous consequences have happened to my own knowledge,(not necessary to be mentioned here) from those animals.
12. A Partisan must be particularly careful of never being drawn into an ambuscade; but on the contrary, should be fruitful in stratagems, to lay snares for the enemy; as in this the most essential part of his duty consists. He should therefore spare no expence in rewarding faithful spies, upon whom his success in enterprises of

this nature, will in a great measure depend; because he must himself lie concealed 'till the moment he is to act; and in order to prevent every possibility of failure in his plans, he should suffer no person, not even women or children, to pass or repass him, before he has struck his blow.

13. When a Partisan intends to attack an enemy's post, by a coup de main, he must endeavour to march in the night undiscovered, to a place where he can lie concealed, as near their post as possible, and from whence he can see their patrol go out in the morning, whom he is to suffer to pass unmolested; but as soon as they are out of sight, he is then to push rapidly forward towards the enemy's post, (of which it is to be presumed, he is already informed of the strength and defence;) and as they will most probably be off their guard, by depending upon their patrols, that are but just sent out, the attack cannot well fail of being successful. Hence it is evident, too much precaution cannot be used by an officer having the command

of any post, and that he should not trust to his patrols alone for safety, as has been before fully explained.

14. It often happens, that a commander in chief has occasion to send a detachment upon a particular secret service, which requires them to cross an unfordable river; it is impossible therefore to cross it, otherwise than by swimming it in the night. To accomplish this, after the Partisan has beforehand informed himself where he can best enter the river, and find a good landing on the other side, the following manner of swimming the horses must be observed.  
-- The first horse's head must be inclined a little towards the current of the river, the second horse's head must be brought up to the saddle of the first, with his head inclined in like manner towards the stream, and so on with all the rest in succession, 'till the whole are passed. -- But to execute such a service as this, it is requisite that the horses should be all good; for if there are any

amongst them that appear unfit or unused to this kind of expedition, it will be prudent, in the Partisan, to leave them behind. -- That the above method is not impracticable, I have been told, by old Austrian officers, who assured me that they had, in the year 1745, swam across that very rapid river the Rhine, at Hoechst and Oppenheim, with whole regiments of hussars. -- I swam across the river Maine, in the month of October, 1761, with a detachment of light cavalry, between Rompelheim and Ovenback, where that river is very deep and rapid, being then on an enterprise, by order of Duke Ferdinand; I executed the service I was sent upon, by taking a French courier, between Oppenheim and Frankfort, at the very time that the Duke had intelligence he was to pass, where I likewise took Baron Blumm, a captain in Chamborant's regiment of hussars.

15. When the corps remains for some time at any station, and the horses are unsaddled, particular care must be

taken, that the saddles are laid up in such a manner, with the pistols in the holsters, that if there should be any sudden occasion to call the men out, they may be ready to mount in a moment; and when in quarters, the saddles must in like manner be laid up ready in the stables. -- Soldiers must take their carbines, pistols, swords, and ammunition, into the rooms where they sleep.

16. When a Partisan has reason to apprehend an attack from the enemy, he must, every evening, send his baggage to some distance in his rear, not only for the sake of preserving, but principally that he may not be incumbered with it, so as to be impeded or retarded in his movements, in case of attack.
17. A Partisan must never consider his station secure, particularly in bad weather, especially if he has to deal with an active enemy. In short, circumspection is so peculiarly his duty, that it cannot be too often inculcated. Of this assertion, the defeat of Colonel Rall,

at Trenton, which has before been mentioned, was a striking though unfortunate proof. Before the enemy could reach his post, they had to cross the river Delaware, amongst thick shoals of ice, while a heavy snow fell, and the weather was intensely cold, and severe, it being Christmas night. From such appearances united, he thought himself perfectly secure from any attack, more especially from troops he held in contempt; but those very circumstances favoured Mr. Washington's design, or indeed presented the opportunity on which he chose to hazard all his success. How far he judged right, the fatal consequences that ensued to the British arms, were a sufficient testimony.

18. One other instance shall be mentioned, to show the fallacy and danger of considering a post secure, on account of the severities and badness of weather, or of any other difficulty an enemy may have to encounter in approaching it. In the year 1780, while General Mathews,

of the British foot guards, commanded at Kingsbridge, a part of the American army, between two and three hundred men in number, were posted at a place called Young's house, behind the White Plains, and were particularly troublesome to the British troops; by intercepting their provisions, and stopping loyalists and deserters who were coming from different parts of the country, to join the British army. Several attempts were made to dislodge and disperse them, but without success. In the month of February, when there happened to be a very heavy fall of snow, which was in several places, for considerable distances together, more than three feet deep; it was resolved to seize the opportunity of making another attempt upon that post; and accordingly Colonel, now General Norton, of the foot guards, undertook the expedition, with the light infantry, and grenadiers of the guards, some Hessian infantry, mounted chasseurs and refugees. -- He set out from Kingsbridge between nine and ten o'clock in the evening, with one

hundred fedges, and two pieces of cannon, which were thought necessary, not only to ease the march over the snow, but also as it was reported that the rebels had fortified Young's house; on proceeding however a short way, the fedges and cannon being found a hindrance, they were both sent back; but the Colonel still determined to prosecute his undertaking without them. He crossed the country, in order to avoid the enemy's patrols, and about nine o'clock next morning arrived at Young's house, which was at the distance of sixteen miles only, in the direct road; effectually surprised and took the whole party, without letting a single man escape, and returned to Kingsbridge that same evening, without leaving a soldier of his own detachment behind, except those who were killed in the attack, having marched, in that time, not less than forty miles.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### *Of Spies.*

There is no branch of the service that requires more judgement than the management of spies, because such kind of people, in general, are actuated solely by the hope of gain; and yet a commander in chief cannot dispense with them, much less a Partisan, who is always stationed at the advanced posts, and from whom the commander in chief has a right to expect perhaps, his best intelligence. The variety of ways in which they are to be made useful, it would not be prudent here to explain; I shall therefore only say a few words on the subject in general.

Spies are to be found of all ranks and prices, as well as of both sexes. Whenever there is occasion for their services, they should be well and punctually paid, and never detained a moment waiting for their reward, lest they should become known to one another, to the officers or soldiers, or any other person besides the commander, by whom they are employed.

If a Partisan should, at any time, discover an enemy's spy amongst his corps, he may, very probably, convert him, by proper management, to his own use and advantage; nor until he has tried every means of making him serviceable, should he in policy punish him; but a careful watch should be set over him, to observe his motions, and endeavour to discover whether he has any acquaintances in the corps, or in the neighbourhood, of its station. The Partisan should take an opportunity of throwing himself in his way, and from his own knowledge of these sort of people, he will most probably not only be able to gain from him, very useful intelligence, but even to engage him in his own interests; in which case, as he has free access to the enemy's army, he may become of infinite importance to the Partisan in the direction of his measures; any information however, he might afterwards give, should not be entirely depended upon, until it is so far confirmed by the accounts of others, as to leave no room for suspicion, or doubt of its certainty and truth.

## CHAPTER IX.

### *Of Expeditions with Cavalry.*

The commander in chief of an army, may often have occasion to employ an enterprising officer, upon particular services, in a great degree connected with the business of the Partisan, and will naturally expect to be furnished with one of this description from the light corps. The service upon which such an officer is generally employed, is to penetrate through the enemy's army, get into their rear, intercept their messengers or couriers, destroy their convoys, or magazines of provisions and ammunition, keep the roads in constant alarm, and distress them in all other respects, as fas as lies in his power; but he is commonly enjoined to direct his chief and principal aim to the interception of couriers or messengers.

Having been entrusted with an enterprise of the latter sort in the last German war, by my commanding officer, General Freytag, I had the good fortune to execute his orders, by intercepting two French couriers, with dispatches from the court of Versailles, to the commander in chief of the French army. This I effected near Frankfort, on the Maine,

more than two hundred miles in the rear of the French army, which was then in the Hanoverian dominions, and conveyed the dispatches to Duke Ferdinand, before the French General had any knowledge of their being intercepted.

Upon my return from this expedition, the success of which obtained me the confidence and esteem of my commander officer, General Freytag, and the good opinion of the Prince Hereditary, the present Duke of Brunswick, I had the honour of being recommended by the latter to Duke Ferdinand, who took me from the Hanoverian chasseurs, and employed me in similar enterprises during the remaining part of the war; The general orders, which he commanded me strictly to observe on this service, were not to molest or injure the peaceable inhabitants of any country, or suffer my detachment to commit depredations on them; to pay for all provisions and other necessaries, whenever it could be done with safety, and without subjecting myself to a discovery, that the enemy might not have it in their power to say, a party had been sent in their rear for the purposes of plunder; to treat such prisoners, as should fall into my hands, with humanity and liberality; and lastly, upon no account whatsoever, to open any dispatches, I should take,

but to convey them directly to head quarters.

Being desirous of assisting every officer who is employed on such service, I do not therefore know how I can more effectually instruct him in the nature of the duty he undertakes, than by mentioning a few of those cases which have happened to myself on service, as the different success which attended my own conduct in them, may help in some measure, to direct his, on the same or similar occasions.

1. In the year 1761, when the French army, under the command of the Duke of Broglie, was in the Hanoverian dominions, I received orders at Sababourg, in Reinhordswald in the Hessian territory, to get in the rear of the army, and endeavour to intercept the couriers coming with dispatches from Paris, to the French commander in chief. I set out in the morning with a detachment, composed of Prussian hussars, and Hanoverian mounted chasseurs, and marched to the river Diemel, on which the furthest advanced post of the allied army was stationed, where my party was furnished with provisions and forage for three days; in the evening I crossed the river near Oxendorff, -- slipped through the enemy's out posts, under the command of General Stainvill, -- continued my march during the

night, through the Waldeck country, and the next day lay concealed in the woods, sending out my spies to get information of the situation of the enemy, and to discover how I could pursue my march the following evening. In this manner I proceeded until I learned that the couriers from Paris, took, at that time, the road from Frankfort to Fulda, in their way to the head quarters of the French army.

On obtaining this intelligence, I ordered my march so as to take post, before day-light, in a wood, between Gelnhausen and Wachtersbach, on the river Kintz, and so near to the road, as to be able to see everything that passed. In this situation I lay two days and two nights. In the afternoon of the third day, the two French couriers, accompanied by a postillion from Gelnhausen, came riding full speed towards the place where I waited to intercept them.

I accordingly took and carried them, with the postillion, into the wood, where I searched them, so that no dispatches or letters could possibly lie concealed about them; informing them, at the same time, it was by Duke Ferdinand's orders I did so, but that they should receive no personal injury. Finding by the directions on the dispatches, that they were most probably those which I had been ordered to

intercept, and anxiously desirous of conveying them, with all possible expedition, to Duke Ferdinand, I resolved to be the bearer of them myself. I left the detachment under the care of the officer next in command, with instructions for his conduct in my absence, charging him to keep the couriers and postillion in safe custody, until I either re-joined him, or let him hear from me.

Having disguised myself, I set out with the dispatches, on my way to the head quarters of the allied army, taking with me a trusty and faithful servant; and, to avoid suspicion, put the dispatches in a portmanteau fixed behind his saddle. I proceeded on my route, meeting with many French officers and other troops, but no interruption until I came to a Hessian village at daybreak, near the river Diemel, where, upon enquiry, I learned that the head quarter of the allied army was then at Bune, near Warburg, and that the patrols of the light troops of both armies, frequently met and skirmished near that village, which was about six miles from it.

From this intelligence of the motions of the enemy's patrols, I was apprehensive it would be difficult for me to avoid falling in with them; I therefore directed my servant to keep at a convenient

distance behind, and if he should see the enemy's patrols stop me, to cut the portmanteau off, quit his horse, which was very tired, and take to the woods.

Being lame from having a little time before [I] sprained my leg, I was obliged to undertake this duty on horseback, otherwise, as soon as I found my danger from the enemy's patrols, I would myself have travelled on foot through the woods with my servant.

I had not got above a mile from the village, when a party, consisting of thirty of Chamborant's hussars, rushed out of a wood, on my right, and immediately seized and examined me. I told them I was a steward to Baron Spiegel, a nobleman well known to them by name; but on searching me, the number of ducats, a gold watch, and in particular, a pair of very valuable Paris pistols, which I had with me, together with other appearances, made them suspect that I was an officer of the allied army, and a spy; they answered therefore, they must escort me to their General, who was not many miles off, and if I proved the person I pretended, everything they had taken from me, should be returned. Knowing, that if I had been conducted to their General's quarters, a discovery must have followed, that would inevitably have proved fatal to my life, as I was taken in disguise, I had no alternative left, but to concert my

escape.

This I most fortunately effected, in a manner, which it would be perhaps, ostentatious in me to relate, and got safe to Duke Ferdinand the same night, when to my inexpressible joy I found, from Adjutant General Wvreyden, that worthy and distinguished officer, who was the first person I met, that my servant had brought in the dispatches. Among these, was a present of some medicines and a child's coral, of great value, from the French court, to the Duchess of Broglio, then lying in child-bed at Hesse Cassell, which Duke Ferdinand immediately sent by a flag of truce.

This was the first intimation the Duke of Broglio had of his dispatches being intercepted. The following are copies of a letter and certificate, I afterwards obtained from General Chamborant, upon another occasion. As they may assist in proving that the hardships and hazards, to which I exposed myself, were undertaken in zeal for the service, and my ambition to deserve the confidence and trust reposed in me, more than any other motives; it will not, I hope, be any intrusion here, to insert them.

Translation of Gen<sup>l</sup> *Chamborant's*

Letter and Certificate.

SIR,

I have received your letter, and I perfectly recollect the manner in which you conducted yourself in your military capacity; and I feel myself happy in having an occasion of doing justice to a brave soldier, and, at the same time, an officer, who behaved so honourably towards the Baron de Blumm, a captain in my regiment, who fell into the hands of your detachment, in his way to his native country; a retreat which his wounds and infirmities obliged him to seek.

Although he has long been dead, yet the circumstance is fresh in my memory; and the certificate, which you have requested, in due form, hereto annexed, will mark the regard and esteem I entertain for military men, who, in their conduct and manners, unite honour and generosity with valour and intelligence. If we should meet again as enemies, and fortune should procure me the advantage which I once had over you, but of which I was prevented from availing myself, I shall endeavour so to soften, by my behaviour towards you, the misfortunes of war, to which we are all liable, and which, under such

circumstances, you would have experienced, that I trust, you will not wish to leave me before the time in which you are authorized to be released by the rules of war.

I have the honour to be,

&c. &c.

Le Ms. de Chamborant.

St. Germain,  
5th Octo. 1773.

#### C E R T I F I C A T E.

We Andrew Claude, Marquis de Chamborant, Lord of Villemendeur, Baron, &c. &c. certify to have known that Captain Andreas Emmerich of the Brunswick Hussars, belonging to the allied army, having particular orders, on the part of their Highness Prince Ferdinand, and the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, to keep in the rear of the French army, fell in with, and took prisoner the Baron de Blumm, on the road from Frankfort to Oppenheim, then returning to his native country, having quitted the service on account of his health and wounds; and that

far from permitting his troops to abuse, or avail themselves of the advantage, which this circumstance offered them, he was satisfied with taking the said officer's horses, for the use of his troops, who stood in need of them; at the same time presenting him with one of his own, to enable him to continue his journey; and that he would not permit, that any part of his baggage, effects, or money should be taken from him.

It is with great readiness we attest this circumstance, and do justice to this act of generosity before that respectable nation, upon which he is making certain claims, and of which all the members serving in the late war, have given proofs of those sentiments, that render the English equally respected by their enemies, as by their allies.

In witness whereof, we have given the said Captain A. Emmerich, the present certificate, in order that it may be of use to him upon all occasions; and we therefore request those, whom it may any way concern, to give and procure him all the aid and assistance which he may have occasion for.

Done at St. Germains, the 13th Day  
of October, 1773.

(L.S.) (L.S.) (L.S.)

I had been but two days at headquarters, when Colonel Bauer, quarter-master general to the allied army, came in great haste to me, at Count de Lippe Buckabourg's, before the Count went to Portugal, and informed me that the French Post-master General would shortly set out, under a very strong guard of cavalry, with all the dispatches from the head quarters of the French army, to Paris, and expressed an anxious wish that they might be intercepted. I perfectly understood that this wish proceeded from the desire of a higher person, and accordingly prepared to comply with it as an order.

Having got a fresh detachment of volunteers, I immediately set out, and as before, slipped through the French army. Learning, on my march, that the Post-master General would travel the same route as the couriers I had lately intercepted, I made such expedition, that I arrived at the place where I had left my former detachment, and joined it four days before the Post-master General passed. As soon as he came up, I attacked his guard, composed of red dragoons, between Wachtersbach and Gelnhausen, near the very spot where I had stopped the two couriers; took him and a Gentleman, who I afterwards understood

to be a Bavarian Ambassador, going from the Duke of Broglie's head quarters, to Paris, with their guard prisoners, secured the dispatches, and having taken the paroles of the Post-master General, and the Ambassador, for themselves and their guard, and procuring the necessary assistance for their wounded men, I immediately forwarded the dispatches, which filled eight leather valises, and loaded four horses, to Duke Ferdinand, to whom they were safely delivered, at Wilhelmstal, near Hesse Cassell. Finding that I could not make use of the other horses I had taken, they were destroyed.

The foregoing are a few of a great number of similar expeditions on which I was ordered, but forbear to detail, presuming that those I have mentioned, will be sufficient to give a proper idea of the nature of the service, upon which an officer, who acts in the same capacity, may be employed, and probably help him to acquit himself, in similar situations, with merit; particularly as it is not courage only, which is necessary, but a genius, fruitful in expedients and resources, address, perseverance, and precaution, must contribute to form a Partisan.

Experience alone however, can render service easy. I found it very practicable to slip through the

enemy's army, on the lower Rhine, remain at any distance I found necessary in their rear, for three, four, and sometimes six weeks; transverse the country, make prisoners, destroy convoys, and magazines of provisions, intercept couriers, and at last get round the flanks of the enemy, through Franconia, and join the allied army, after having happily accomplished every object of the service entrusted to me, without incurring any censure or reproaches on my conduct from the enemy. This sort of expedition I repeated eleven times in the space of two campaigns, from the beginning of the year 1761, until the peace in 1762.

## CHAPTER X.

### *Rules to be observed by a Partisan, on Service.*

Having in the last chapter mentioned a few of the enterprises, the execution of which had been entrusted to my particular care, I shall here speak of those general rules for the service, which, if properly attended to, may be of use to future Partisans, as they are entirely the result of my own experience, during the time I was appointed to such commands.

No consideration whatsoever should induce a Partisan to disguise himself upon any occasion; the fatal consequences that may attend such a step, I myself narrowly escaped, as the instance a little before related, must have shown.

When a Partisan is ordered on an expedition, a detachment is usually formed of volunteers from the different regiments of light troops in the army, and put under his command; that in case the detachment should be taken, the loss may more easily be borne, than if it had been wholly drafted from one.

He should himself take care that the men are young, active, well armed and mounted, that the captains, from whose troops they are taken, can vouch for their being men of good character, and acquainted with service; and upon no account, suffer a deserter from the enemy, much less a man the least suspected of drinking, to be one of the number. Although the former might be naturally brave on any other occasion, yet the dread he must be under, from the chance of his being taken prisoner, makes him altogether unfit for service of this nature. And as to the latter, there are so many opportunities in the expeditions of a Partisan, of committing excesses, from which the greatest inconveniences and dangerous accidents often arise, that no dependence can be placed by him on men, who are not constitutionally temperate and sober.

As soon as the detachment is put under the Partisan's command, and he has received his orders, he is to move with it behind the army, and carefully inspect both men and horses, to see that they are properly equipped in every point, particularly that every man is furnished with two spare horse shoes, fitted to his horse's feet, and a proper number of nails; and lastly, that his detachment is provided with three days provision and forage, no part of which

must be touched before he sets out. Previous to his march, an intelligent spy should be dispatched before him on the route he intends to pursue.

When he has everything in readiness, he should regulate his march, so as to be near the enemy's advanced posts pretty early in the morning, take his ground as if he meant to keep it, and place videts accordingly. During the day, he must be diligent in finding out the situation of the enemy, and make his attempt soon to slip, undiscerned, through their line, as then he has the whole night before him, to effect this most difficult and dangerous pass on his expedition.

Should he meet with any of the enemy's patrols, or have reason to think that he is discovered, it will be prudent to return, and wait an opportunity next night, of passing through some other part of their line. If he has no cause however for such apprehensions, after he has got into the rear of their army, he must continue his march with all convenient expedition, avoiding the roads as much as possible, and taking post always before morning in a wood, or other place, where he can lie concealed during the day. He is then to send out his spies, to learn if there is any rumour respecting his detachment, and at the

same time to find out the securest course for continuing his march at night, leaving however one of his spies on the ground which he quits, with injunctions to remain there the greatest part of the next day, and instructions where to find him in the evening of it. If no party from the enemy should appear in quest of him, it will be a sure sign that he has not been discovered, and that he has surmounted his greatest difficulty.

In this manner the Partisan must proceed towards the object of his expedition, leaving always a spy at the last place he quits, with distinct directions to follow him wherever he goes. But as the detachment advances a considerable way in the rear of the enemy's army, it is not to be supposed that the Partisan can always ascertain the spot where the spy is to join him, in which case it will be necessary to fall upon some expedient to obviate this difficulty; as for instance, by appointing some public house, or place where he is to wait 'till a person shall appear, who from some particular mark will be known to him, and who shall also know him, by a signal previously concerted between the Partisan and the spy.

The person sent from the detachment to meet the spy, might be instructed to wear a handkerchief

tied under his chin, as if he had the toothache, and the spy might have some mark about him, which would immediately discover to the other the purpose for which they were met, without making either of them liable to suspicion from spectators, -- or many other contrivances might answer the same purpose. There should also, at every place where he stops, certain trees, stones, or other remarkable objects, be agreed upon between the Partisan and his spy, for the purpose of leaving directions upon them where to follow him, or perhaps a letter, with instructions for that or any other necessary step.

When the detachment is so far advanced, without recruiting their store of provisions and forage, that their first stock is consequently consumed, and a fresh supply absolutely necessary, it may not be improper to point out the means of procuring it, least likely to expose them to a discovery. While the enemy have no apprehensions that any party of troops, besides their own, can be at so great a distance in the rear of their army, the farmers of the country are only required to bring in their provisions and forage to the nearest magazines. As this is generally done without a guard, the Partisan should send out one of his spies, to bring him intelligence of the time when such provisions and forage are on the road.

He is then to march his detachment near the place where they are to pass in the night, tell the farmers he belongs to the army, for which the provisions, &c. are intended, and that being in want of a supply, they must furnish him with what he requires, for which he should give them fictitious receipts. He must afterwards, also direct his march, as if he was going towards the enemy's army, to leave no room for suspicion; but turn out of the road when he thinks proper, and regain his former station. Care must be taken, however, that the language of the enemy, and no other, is spoken to the farmers, if it is understood by the Partisan, or any of his detachment, if not, some undistinguishable jargon must be used, to disguise their own.

But it may happen, that though the Partisan can procure forage, he may not be able to obtain provisions for his men, in the manner above stated, in which case, as it is impossible to do without them, recourse must be had to some other method of supply. That which I have found, from experience, to be the best, is to look out for a sheepfold, during the march in the night, and send two or three men to inform the keeper of the fold that they belong to a party of the enemy, which being in want of

provisions, must have some of his sheep, and accordingly bring away as many as will serve the detachment for three or four days. It is much to be wished that such injuries could be avoided, by paying the value for whatever is taken from the country people; but as offering money would expose the detachment to suspicions, which might frustrate the execution of its designs, all other considerations must give way to the necessities of the service. Two or three fictitious letters, which he should have ready written with him, or other papers, addressed to officers belonging to the enemy's army, should be dropped, seemingly by accident, that they might be picked up by the keeper of the sheep-fold, in the morning, as they might amuse, and lead him to believe the grounds of the application, and trust to a retribution from that quarter.

The Partisan must never suffer his detachment to make fires, when he is lying concealed in the woods, during the day, but find out the most contiguous single farm-house, to his station, where the meat may be carried and dressed, taking care to secure every person in it, and make the farmer furnish him with bread, sufficient for three days; but, in the evening before the detachment marches, he should be told, that if a word transpires, either of

their motions or stay with him, not only his personal safety, but that of his family and property, would be in danger. He should then be liberally paid for whatever he had furnished, and generous presents also made to himself, and every person in his house. This mode of treatment will, probably, not only prevent him or his people from discovering the detachment to the enemy, but incline him, from self-interest, to render any service to the party, in his power, if they should ever pass his way again.

When the Partisan meets with a single farm or other house, near a wood, where he can be safe, and the owner of it willing to supply him, for payment, with everything he wants, it will be prudent in him, to attach such a person to his interests, by paying liberally, and even double price for all the provisions or other necessaries which are furnished by him; as artifices or violence, which are often the means resorted to, for procuring both, always lead more or less to the discovery of a Partisan and his party; not to mention that when he makes a friend of this kind, first by the temptation of grain, and lastly by the secret collusion he draws him into, with the views of an enemy, of which the punishment is death, he secures not only good and safe quarters to himself in future, but even a secret supply of provisions, if

requisite, while he is at any other station, of moderate distance, in the same neighbourhood. By careful behaviour on every such occasion, I never failed to make myself friends, who supplied me with money, or whatever I wanted, and made me require at last to carry no money with me from the army.

What has been just mentioned, must be understood to apply to a country, rather friendly to the Partisan's cause, or at least neuter in it; for in any other situation, where he cannot but expect the inhabitants to be hostile to all his intentions, he must make no such attempts. If he cannot complete his march through an enemy's province in the night, he must discontinue it at day-break, and lie concealed in the woods, whether he has provisions and forage enough for the day or not, until evening returns, when he must supply himself and party in the best way he can. If there is any grass in the wood, a certain number of the horses may be unbridled, at a time, and allowed to graze, while the men hold them by a halter in one hand, and keep the bridles ready in the other, until the whole of them have had a little refreshment. If any country people should happen to pass, and see where the detachment is lying, they must be secured, if possible, until evening, when, as the party moves, a present should be given them for

their detention. The Partisan is then to take a false route for his march, until he thinks he is clear of their observation, when he may alter his course, and proceed towards his destination.

Before the Partisan takes the station where he intends to wait for the objects of his expedition, he must be particularly careful to have three or four days provision for his men and horses, and know from his spies, that there is plenty of water, at or near his post in the wood; in order that if he should find it necessary to remain there a day or two longer than he intended, or should be pursued by an enemy, after he has executed the service required, he may be ready to retreat, or make his escape, without hindrance or delay.

While the Partisan advances on his route, he must take notice of every building, particularly every castle or strong single house in his way, which in case of any hard attack upon him by cavalry, and desperate circumstances, would form a retreat to him where he might probably be able to defend himself, during a day, while no infantry were at hand, to blockade and reduce his party, and from whence, in the evening he might, by a spirited effort, at a favourable opportunity, force his way through the enemy. If this

should not be practicable, rather than give the enemy time to bring infantry to their assistance, and thus run the risk of being taken with both men and horses, the detachment must be dismounted, the horses left behind, but destroyed, and a sally made on foot, in order to effect the best retreat possible in the night. This case never happened to myself, but as it may to others, I mention the best resource on such an occasion, and that of which I should have availed myself, had it ever proved necessary.

As a Partisan, however, would be uneasy, and even ashamed to return to head quarters without horses, he may recruit his loss, by captures from the enemy, for which, in the rear of an army, there is always plenty of opportunity. And although he may not be able to equip his detachment with horses and furniture, equally fit for his service, yet he may return double the number to the army, which will offer a good apology for his misfortune, relieve his reputation, and entitle him to the conduct of another expedition, when he may seek for revenge or reprisals.

Men who are brave and zealous in their profession can effect, what to others would appear impossible, particularly if they are so lucky as to have

a commander in chief, who is beloved by the army, and knows how to cherish and reward efforts of distinction and merit.

A Partisan must not, on such expeditions, seek occasions of attacking or engaging with the enemy, but on the contrary, avoid them as much as he can; for it is not in his power to take any proper care of the wounded, on the stations which he must in general chose, much less to convey them to the army; besides, that they are entirely foreign to the service required of him, which is not to operate with strength, but address in war. If a courier, however, passes his post, under an escort of the enemy's army, whom he cannot take without an attack, he must then, as a soldier, risk everything, in the execution of his duty; but to expose men, because they are brave and volunteers in the service, rashly and wantonly, for plunder, or idle fame, is disgraceful to an officer, and proves him unfit for his command.

## CHAPTER XI.

### *The Mode of Attack, to intercept Couriers, &c.*

As soon as the Partisan has chosen his station near the road, where he expects couriers to and from the enemy or others to pass, he must dispatch his spies to the nearest towns or villages, on his right and left. The whole main body may dismount, and keep the bridles in their hands, excepting fourteen, four of whom must be stationed at some distance on the right, and four, at a similar distance, on the left, both within call, and so near the road as to see what passes, without being seen. The other six must remain with the main body, but keep themselves in constant readiness. The Partisan must then step, on foot, from the main body, close to the road, or climb a tree, from whence he can carefully watch it, unseen, and prevent any wrong person, such as a merchant, an officer belonging to the army of the enemy, or any indifferent passenger, from being stopped, which might, by creating an alarm, defeat the principal object in view, by the commander in chief. By letting a few persons pass quietly, to or from the enemy, particularly if they have any baggage of value with

them, or if there should have been any rumours of the detachment's situation, the roads will be reputed safe, and couriers will consequently be enjoined to travel the same way.

When this deposition of the party is made, and a courier is seen coming by day, for by night every passenger or carriage, must be stopped; the Partisan, as soon as he sees him advance within his line, gives the signal to his three small parties, who immediately make to the road, while the main body mount, and keep in readiness to support them, if necessary.

When the courier is taken, which must be done without firing, if possible, in order to avoid giving any alarm, great care must be taken to prevent him from destroying or dropping any of his dispatches, particularly in the night. He should be immediately removed from the road into the wood or mountains, his pockets, saddle, boots, and everything else about himself or horse strictly searched, and every paper, found upon him, carefully secured. The place on the road, where he was taken, should at the same time be instantly examined, that nothing which might fall from the men or horses, by accident, and excite suspicion in other passengers, may be left upon the ground. If any country or other people

should be witnesses of the encounter, an endeavour should be made, to secure and detain them, until the party moves to another station.

The Partisan should, on every occasion, acquaint couriers that he wants nothing from them but their dispatches, and what the rules of war allow. As it most always happens, that a courier is accompanied by a postillion from the next post-house, the Partisan must, in this case, make him, privately, a handsome present, which will induce him to let himself be taken on other opportunities, and perhaps be otherwise serviceable, as I have myself experienced.

Immediately after taking the dispatches of the enemy, the Partisan should lose no time in sending them off, by careful persons, to the commander in chief, as the great point is to convey them to him, before the enemy know of their being intercepted. The prisoners therefore must be detained, until such time as he thinks they may be received. If however, a prisoner should, on any occasion, make his escape, the Partisan must think of his own safety, as his situation will then become dangerous, from the certainty of its being immediately after discovered to the enemy.

When a Partisan has accomplished his chief object, he is still not to quit his station. He may remain there for a day or two longer, and advance the service, by other captures and detriment to the enemy, before he is discovered; such as officers, provisions, forage, &c. &c. He must however never fail in the proper treatment of the enemies that fall into his hands. They should be used always strictly according to the rules of war, which admit of neither insult nor injury to prisoners. The personal property they may have about them, such as money, watches, &c. ought to be civilly, but privately demanded by one of the non-commissioned officers, and distributed among themselves and the privates, as their perquisites(sic), on such service, but nothing of this kind ever appropriated to himself. Baggage of every kind must be restored to them, untouched. All their arms, however, must be taken from them, and immediately broken to pieces. He should always have plenty of blank paroles in the language of the enemy, with him, which his prisoners, of every rank, are to fill up, when he dismisses them; at which time he ought to take care that they have money enough left for the expences of their journey to the next garrison. If he should happen to make prisoners of passengers, such

as merchants, or other persons, who are unconnected with the war or the enemy, he may secure their stay with him until he changes his station, but upon no account make them suffer any other loss or inconvenience, than that detention, which the safety of the service requires.

A strict observance of the rules of war, by a Partisan, particularly in his behaviour and conduct to prisoners, is essentially requisite, as it adds merit to every successful expedition, and lessens the misfortune of every defeat, by exciting the same disposition in an enemy. By invariably attending to them, he leaves none but pleasing reflections in his own mind, on the services he has undergone.

If, while he still remains at his station, provisions, forage or horses, going for the use of the enemy, should pass, if they cannot be removed from the road into the woods, after they are stopped, the waggons which carry them must be burnt where they stand; the provisions, if flour, must be strewed about on the ground, and trampled under the feet of the horses; -- of the cavalry going for the use of the enemy, the best should be selected, to supply the place of those in the detachment, which may be worn out by hard service; the rest must be destroyed. If

there should be wine or other liquors amongst the provisions, the casks must be set on end, their tops taken out, and rendered useless, and the wine left for the benefit and regale of the neighbouring inhabitants, who will not fail to profit by the opportunity. Such an incident, produces a friendly understanding between them and the Partisan, as I have frequently experienced, particularly in the country round Frankfort, on the Maine, &c. On such occasions, however, the Partisan, after allowing his detachment a moderate stock of liquors for use, during their stay on that station, must carefully endeavour to prevent, as well as forbid and caution them, under severe penalties, against the least intemperance or abuse of his indulgence.

When a Partisan has made his last efforts to distress the enemy, and committed himself so far to their notice and observation, by these open attacks, as to render his station exceedingly insecure, he should lose no time in preparing to leave it; if he is near any garrison of the enemy where there are cavalry, his danger is still more pressing. He must, immediately therefore, summon all his prisoners, and enquire how they have been treated, that if they have suffered any insult or wrong, it may be punished, or redressed, and that they may be put in a condition to make their

journey to the next garrison. If the next garrison should be at a great distance however, and the horses of the officers who are prisoners, should not be wanted by the detachment, or could not be conveniently led along with it to the army, the Partisan will act prudently in returning them to their owners, as they are private property, rather than destroying them.

A few hours before the departure of his prisoners, whom he must always dismiss towards evening, he should endeavour to amuse them with a false idea, of his route, by mentioning the names of one or two places in a quite contrary direction to it; and asking information as to their situation and distance. When they take leave, he should be ready to set out with his detachment, and take the course he proposed to them, for a little way, in order to confirm their belief of his intentions; but as soon as he thinks they are at a sufficient distance, he may turn about, and proceed to the station it will be proper for him next to chose, according to the intelligence his spies have furnished him of the dispositions of the enemy. As it is very probable that the prisoners, who have left him, will spread this false information, as to his route, among the neighbouring garrisons, and totally mislead any strong party that is

sent in pursuit of his detachment, he will have an easy and safe opportunity of taking post near to some other road, which is thought secure by the enemy, and effecting a repetition of the same important services, before he quits their rear, and returns to his own army.

It is at such a moment that a Partisan has the utmost scope for action; and may severely pinch, if not distress the enemy. When his spies have laid open to him the whole situation of their ground, and perhaps discovered that a party is sent a false and distant route in quest of him, he may act openly for several days, attack, and effectually destroy every magazine that is not too strongly guarded, intercept couriers, make prisoners, and create damage and confusion everywhere.

By this artful change of his situation, and appearing with his detachment by day, the enemy, not aware of its being one and the same party, will apprehend different forces to be traversing their country; and spread an alarm, until the garrisons shut themselves up, and every communication and passage is stopped behind their army. This circumstance happened on several of my expeditions to the towns of Hannau and Frankfort where

between two and three thousand men were in garrison, and is always attended with the greatest inconvenience and interruption to the plans of an enemy.

Before they can gain perfect intelligence of the Partisan's change of station, or his strength, and send a party to attack him, he must shape his march back to his own army, with the utmost caution and expedition.

As soon as he arrives at head-quarters, he should make his return so public, at the enemy's advanced posts, that they may know it, discontinue their search after him, and relax in their vigilance; when the Partisan, as long as the season permits, must again leave head-quarters, recover his ground in the rear of their army, and continue to act as before, wherever he can be of benefit to the service; to which, his experience, and the perfect intelligence his spies, whom he leaves behind in the mean time, must be able to gain, of every disposition and plan, formed by the adversary, in that quarter, will powerfully contribute.

Notwithstanding so much has been said of the precautions necessary to be used by a Partisan, I have

by no means been successful in all my expeditions, but like every soldier, whose life is checkered with victory and defeat, have met with disappointments and miscarriages. On this account, I am more confident in offering to others that advice, by the want of which I have sailed myself. -- The following are two instances.

In the year 1759, after the retreat of the allied army, from the battle of Bergen, near Frankfort, on the Maine, I was ordered with a detachment of cavalry, into the Bishop of Wurstburg's dominions, for the purpose of reconnoitring the situation of the Imperial army.

I proceeded to a town called Lower Weisbach, where I improperly dismounted all my men, and allowed them to refresh, without apprehension of any enemy, as upon enquiry at the inhabitants of that place and its neighbourhood, I could hear of none.

A detachment of the Emperor's hussars, named Schichine, and the Hohenzollern, Cuirassiers, who were concealed in a wood, near the village, and saw me enter it at mid-day, seized the opportunity, and made me and my detachment prisoners. If I had dismounted a part of my men only, at a time, and

kept proper watch, this would not have happened.

I had met that morning, between Upper and Lower Weisbach, a Roman Catholic Priest, who declared to me, on his priestly honour, that he had seen no Imperial troops; but the Cuirassiers told me, soon after they took me, that they had made a stop at his house the evening before.

In the year 1760, when the battle of Johanesberg, near Fridberg, was fought, between the Hereditary Prince, now Duke of Brunswick, and Prince Condé, commander of the French army, who was joined by Prince Soubise with his army, I was ordered with a detachment of cavalry, behind both the latter, in order, that if the French lost the battle, I might fall upon their baggage, and by occasioning an alarm, retard their retreat. I took my station, for this purpose, in a wood near Filbel, on the river Neida, about nine miles behind the French armies, and about half a mile from the road, where some hundred of their baggage-waggons were passing. In the time of the battle, which began in the morning, I conceived, from the motions of the French, and my spies also reported, that they had lost, as their army was twice driven back, though they recovered, and continued

the engagement. I however, considered the allied army had gained the day, and could not any longer check my impatience to attack the multitude of baggage before me; I accordingly went out, from the wood, with my detachment, amongst them, and continued taking possession of them, for some time, until I was attacked by Conflans's hussars, and dragoons; I was soon sensible of my mistake, and the precipitation of my conduct; but my men were so dispersed, that I returned with only a few of my number to the allied army, at Staden, in the night; where I suffered no small derision at my disappointment and failure, which my ardour and impatience had chiefly occasioned. Had I waited 'till night, for the success of my enterprise, I might, by an attack then, have startled the enemy, notwithstanding their victory, as they could not have guessed at my strength, and made myself master of a great part of their baggage.

## CHAPTER XII.

### *Of Expeditions with Infantry.*

The service of a Partisan with cavalry, can only be performed in those seasons of the year, during which there is forage abroad for horses, and men can endure to be exposed continually to the open air. In winter, when frost and snow allow little or no forage abroad, and force men into regular quarters, the Partisan can no longer act with his cavalry. Were the severity of that season, however, no obstacle to the service, a body of horse are too easily tracked on snow, to make their motions secure; besides, that they cannot then be conveniently rough-shod, without being liable to a discovery.

At the same time, a commander in chief may require a Partisan to undertake an expedition, and get into the rear of the enemy's army, in winter, however difficult and hazardous the enterprise may seem. As he cannot then, with propriety, employ horses, he must make use of infantry, that is, chasseurs on foot, who should be all picked men, and volunteers. -- A piece of duty, on which I was ordered in the year 1761, will perhaps give an idea of the nature of such

service.

About the middle of November, at which time the weather was very unfavourable, as the allied army was stationed at the Hube, near Einbeck, in the Hanoverian dominions, and the French about three miles from them, the centinels of both armies being almost near enough to speak with each other, I requested a detachment of General Freytag's chasseurs, on foot, to be put under my command, finding that though I was not positively ordered, it was the wish of Duke Ferdinand, that I should endeavour to get in the rear of the enemy, to reconnoitre their posts, alarm and distress them to the utmost of my power. Emulated by a desire to gain the esteem of commanders so admired and beloved as Duke Ferdinand, and the Hereditary Prince, now Duke of Brunswick, I undertook the expedition on foot. I set out from the neighbourhood of Lord Fred. Cavendish's post, then commanding the British chasseurs, passed through the Soling Forest, to Goslar, crossed the river Weser, near Hochster; from thence to Warburg, where I tried to slip through the enemy, by Battenburg, but was discovered by Chamborant's hussars, and obliged to go back to Lipstad, where Colonel Munro, of Hanoverian troops, commanded. I remained there for some days, before I

could get through the French posts. At last I succeeded, and crossed the river Rure, by Swerden, in the night, passed Iserlow, Ludenshid, towards Newvitt, then turned to my left, towards Marburg, adjoining to the road from Frankfort to Cassell; came into the dominions of the Counts of Witgenstein and Berleburg, where I learned, that after my departure, the allied and French armies had gone into winter quarters, that I was then in the middle of the French army, and, consequently, in so critical a situation, that my first indispensable object was, to endeavour to effect my retreat, if it were possible. While I directed my march for this purpose, however, I lost no opportunity of doing detriment to the enemy. Some couriers, who travelled in waggons, which was a mode of conveyance I did not suspect them to use, escaped me; but I raised an alarm everywhere on the roads, destroyed many young horses going to the enemy, took several officers prisoner, on their way from Cassell to Frankfort, and nearly made a prize of the Duke of Broglio himself, the commander in chief of the French army. The Duke had moved his headquarters, from Cassell to Frankfort. As he passed from the former to the latter place, I was posted in a wood, between the villages of Jesberg and Holshausen, near a hollow part of the way, about one hundred and fifty yards from the road.

The Duke was preceded by about fifty Nassau hussars, and followed by Shomberg's dragoons, a guard, by far too formidable for my detachment. Before he came into the hollow way, if I am not mistaken, he looked straight towards the tree, behind which I stood, as if he had suspected the spot.

From thence I continued my march by Zigenhein and Humberg, in the Hessian dominions, towards Melzungen, where I crossed the river Fulda, on ice, proceeded towards Cassell, where the Duke's brother, Count Broglio, commanded, with ten thousand men, and stopped on Christmas night, at the village of Hielige Rode, where, agreeable to particular intelligence I had received, I took a French Commissary-general, in the house of the clergyman of that place. A report being spread of this circumstance, by the firing of alarm cannon, in Cassell, the French troops came out in quest of me, and kept watch on every road. From Hielige Rode, I made good my retreat, however, through deep snow, to Auschlach and Landwernhagen, where I took four French officers, in bed; proceeded to Spikershausen; crossed the Fulda again, upon the ice, and came to Wilhelmshausen; passed the Reinhard's Wald; re-crossed the Weser, by Hochster and the Soling

Forest, until I reached Einbeck, about the 6th of January, where I found General Luckner, who had the outpost of the allied army. This march, which lasted nearly two months, was performed on foot, without losing, or leaving a single man behind, belonging to my detachment.

Whoever will take the trouble to trace this route, on a map of those countries, will have a still clearer idea of what zeal in service, joined to a hardy constitution, can effect. A minute detail of my march, in this expedition, would oblige me to mention circumstances, which I could not do with safety to those, who are still living in honour and respect, in their own countries; for the sake of those, however, who may adventure on the same duty hereafter, I shall describe how I regulated my movements, the precautions I took, and the means I made use of, to find provisions for my detachment, in so difficult a situation as I was placed, being in the center of the enemy's army, which was one hundred thousand men strong, and filled every town and village with its troops.

I began my march in the evening, and continued it during the night. A little before day-break, I tried to get into a house that stood alone, and

at a distance from any town or village, where I laid, during the day, which was, at that season very short; marched again at evening, and again, before day, got into a solitary house.

When I stopped at such a house, for the day, my first precaution was to secure every person in it, until my departure. If I suffered a farmer or his servants, to go out of the house to feed their cattle, or to get any other necessary thing for himself or my detachment, one of my men always attended him, in disguise, 'till he returned. The provisions which I obliged the farmers to furnish, I paid for liberally; and before I left their houses, I always made handsome presents besides, to themselves and their servants; -- at the same time, threatening them with severe revenge, if they discovered, upon any occasion, the stay I had made with them. Generous treatment, I found, not only gave ease to my expedition, but procure me so much friendship and good wishes, that if I came again, I might expect their doors to be freely opened to me.

Should a visitor come to a house, where a detachment is lying, during the day, he must also be secured, 'till night, and then recompensed for his detention. In a country, however, the inhabitants of

which are friendly to the cause of the enemy, this goodwill cannot be expected. When the French found out, how I had escaped their notice and observation, in the manner above mentioned, they publish'd an order, that none of the inhabitants of the country should wear green clothes, which was the uniform of my party; and that any person who heard, and did not give an account of me, to the next garrison, should be hanged at his own door.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### *Of a Surprise by Night.*

In order to prove successful in an attack, by surprise, in the night, upon any post, which happens to lie in his direct road, and if no taken, might frustrate his expedition, or otherwise impede the service, the Partisan must gain perfect information of the strength and number of the enemy, whether they are in camp or in quarters; if cavalry or infantry; their distance from any garrison, and where their centinels are placed.

He must then dismount the best part of his men, at a proper distance from the enemy, while the remainder hold their horses. Those who are for the attack must sling their carbines, and with sword in hand, rush suddenly upon the adversary. -- The men should, before the attack, have a signal word given them, to prevent any mistake from being made, and their falling upon each other; as, in the night, some confusion is often apt to happen, though such a step may at times, be necessary, to open a passage for the Partisan, to the object of his expedition, if he can avoid it, it is always more prudent and safe.

The following circumstance happened in 1762. While I was in the rear of the French army, in the neighbourhood of Newvitt, near the river Rhine, a detachment of Conslangs's hussars, commanded by Captain Saltikoff, which had been long in search of me, becoming at last tired of their pursuit, or imagining that I had returned to the allied army, took up their quarters, on a Sunday evening, at a village near Weyersbach, consisting of eight large farm houses, which stood close together. He ordered a certain number of his men to each house, and proposed to resume his march about two o'clock next morning. Having intelligence of his situation, I sent my spy to the village, who heard Captain Saltikoff give his last orders to his men, which were to retire soon to rest, and be ready to set out at the time above-mentioned.

About nine o'clock in the evening, I advanced within a small distance of the village, and dismounted the greatest part of my detachment. Having called also at a post-house, about half a mile from it, I enquired of the post-master if he had seen any of my people, who answered, that I should find all my party in the farm houses of the village before me. Upon this, I stepped softly up to the village, and saw,

through the window of each house, the number of soldiers in it, some of whom were playing at cards, some eating and drinking, and others asleep. I accordingly gave orders with respect to how many of my men should attack each house, and upon a signal given, they were all attacked, and forcibly entered at the same moment, and Captain Saltikoff and his detachment made prisoners, without a shot being fired.

Having now offered every useful observation that occurs to my memory, on the subject of this treatise, I have only to add, that the account which I have endeavoured to give, of the duty of a Partisan, and the use of a corps of light troops, to an army, is not obtained from books, having never met with anyone on the subject. It is drawn from the experience I had in the service, and the various expeditions, I undertook in that capacity and command. I trust, it will inform and impress every young officer, with the indispensable necessity of precaution in forming, and resolution in executing every military enterprise. It may also be amusing, but cannot be displeasing to the old soldier, to be put in remembrance of his former life and actions. If my hints, should induce anyone of the latter, to say more on the subject, and dilate the ideas, I may have too

faintly expressed to their full extent, I shall consider it as the highest approbation of what I have done.

To conclude, as it is often difficult, in time of war, to find select chasseurs, who are active, good marksmen, and well acquainted with the use of a rifle, I submit to better judges, whether it might not be attended with great convenience and benefit to the service, if two active men, of every company of every regiment in it, were taught the use of a rifle, as a man, who is not very expert in using a rifle, cannot have a more improper piece put into his hands; and the other points of duty belonging to light troops; in order, that when occasion required, they might be formed into a corps for the use of the army.

F I N I S.